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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
11314

IVA LEE GILLIAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal prosecution wherein the appellant
was charged by an information with the crime of first degree murder pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-1 (1953)
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on December 26, 1967.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The trial was held before the Honorable MiarceHus K.
Snow, Judge, presiding. The jury rendered a verdict of
guilty of murder in the first degree on February 2, 1969.
They recommended leniency and the trial judge accordingly
sentenced her to the Utah State Prison for life.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent asks this Court to affirm the judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court on the basis that no
reversible errors were committed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Iva Lee Gillian and a WiHiam Miller,
had lived together for several years before separating. Even
after the separation they had frequent contacts with each
other. On November 4, 1967, the victim, Jesse A. Melton,
was living with Mr. Miller in apartment No. 3 at 21 West
1700 South in Salt Lake City, Utah (T. 304). Mr. Miller,
who was unemployed at this time, had been staying with
Mr. Melton for about a week prior to November 4 (T. 305).
This apartment was very small, with only one room divided
by a partition (T.170, 177).
On Friday, November 3, 1969, one Bernice Simmons
came to the apartment late that night and the three of
them, Miller, Melton, and Mrs. Simmons, sat around and
talked most of the night (T. 306, 314). At about six o'clock
on the morning of the fourth, the appellant came to the
apartment (T. 366). At this point the testimony of the
appellant varies with that of Mr. Miller and Mrs. Simmons
as to what type of scuffle bet\veen Miller and appellant
actually occurred (T. 307, 309, 366). At any rate, the evidence is clear that some scuffle did occur and that Miller
shoved the appellant out the door (T. 309). At this time
the door was locked. She then went to her car and got a
.22 caliber gun and went to the west window of the apart-
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ment and fired the gun at least seven times into the small
room (T. 369), killing the victim, Mr. Melton (T. 309).
The gun was found in appellant's purse when she was
arrested ( T. 245), and an F. B. I. ballistics expert identified
the gun as the weapon which killed the victim (T. 348)
and also as the weapon which fired other bullets as evidenced by the six casings found on the window sill (T.
346).
Based upon this evidence and the testimony of the
appellant herself, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of
murder in the first degree, with the recommendation of
leniency. The appellant is appealing that conviction.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING A LESSER INCLUDED 0 FF ENS E
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AS TO
A LESSER OFFENSE.
The appellant ·was convicted of first degree murder
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953) ,i.e., " ....
perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of
others and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human life . . . " The evidence presented by the State warranted the instruction of first degree murder within the
meaning of the statute. And if the evidence does not justify an instruction of a lesser included offense, the court
does not need to submit the lesser offense to the jury. Instructions should not be given in a homicide case which
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are unsupported by the evidence. State v. Condit, 101
Utah 558, 125 P. 2d 801 (1942); State v. Pierce, 17 Utah
2d 394, 412 P. 2d 923 (1966).
In making this argument, the appellant assumes that
the evidence supports a finding of second degree murder
or even vdluntary manslaughter. This can be so only: (1)
"When the establishment of the greater offense would necessarily include proof of all the elements necessary to prove
the lesser." State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 198, 371 P.
2d 27, 29 (1962), (emphasis added), and (2) the evidence
warrants such an instruction. The elements and evidence
required to prove first degree murder by an act greatly
dangerous to the lives of others with evidence of a depraved
mind regardless of human life are spelled out in detail in
State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 153 (1946).
The Court said:
" ... It is not necessary that there be a previ·
ously thought out intention to kill the person killed
or any other particular person nor is ·there a necessity for deliberate or cool weighing of such planned
course of action. But there must be a previously
thought out plan, design and intentiona•l doing of an
acl which is greatly dangerous to the lives of others,
with the knowledge and a full realization that the
natural and probable consequences thereof wiH cause
death or great bodily injury to other persons and
the surrounding circumstances of such killing must
be such as to evidence to the jury a depraved mind
with no regard whatever for human life." Id. at
127, 170 P. 2d at 160.
The only elements required under this category are whether
the evidence will justify a finding that the act which the
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appellant did was greatly dangerous to the lives of others,
and whether she knew when doing that act that its probable consequences would be to cause death or great bodily
injury, and whether the circumstances of the killing evidence a depraved mind without any regard for human life.
If the evidence supports this category, then there can be no
second degree murder because second degree murder is any
other killing which would constitute "murder at common
law." Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953). If there can be
no second degree murder under the evidence then there
can be no instruction given. The Court further stated in
Thornpson, supra, that:
"The evidence in those respects is clearly sufficient unless it only indicated an intention to kill
the deceased, rather then that it was directed at
people generalily. We think frorn the manner of fir-

ing indiscriminately at all the people in the room
the evidence was sufficient to justify a submission
on that question." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

This fact alone seemed sufficient to warrant a first degree
murder instruction.
The ,appellant also suggests that the crime of voluntary
manslaughter was warranted by the evidence. This suggestion assumes again that voluntary manslaughter is "necessarily" included in first degree murder. This is not the
case as was pointed out in State v. Mitchell, 3 Utaih 2d 70,
278 P. 2d 618 (1955) ..
"Voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily inc'luded in first degree murder. Nor is it always the
duty of the court to instruct on the lesser offense,
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-for example where either a conviction or outright
acquittal of a particular offense is mandatory, leaving no room to hold an accused for any other offense." Id. at 75, 278 P. 2d at 621.
The appellant has assumed the lesser offense rwithout actually showing that it is included within the greater. Voluntary "manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human
being without malice(,) upon a sudden quarrel or in the
heat of passion." Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-5 (1953). The
appellant contends that merely because there was a quarrel
and she was pushed out the door, the evidence warrants an
instruction of voluntary manslaughter. However, there
must be "sudden passion" upon reasonable provocation before the law will reduce the killing to manslaughter. State
V. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102, 396 P. 2d 414 ( 1964); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-30-5 (1953). The element of sudden quarrel or heat of passion was not found in this case to be the
cause of the killing. On the contrary, it was a previously
thought out plan, design and intentional doing of an act
which was greatly dangerous to the lives of others. The
appellant, after confronting Miller, rwent back to her car,
took out the gun she had brought with her, went to the
window and fired it into the smaH room (T. 369). The
victim was not even the person with whom she had scuffled
(T. 309) .. She fully realized and knew that the natural and
probable consequences of the act of shooting into the room
would cause death or great bodily injury to one or more
persons, and in so doing she evidenced a depraved mind
with no regard for human life (T. 369). The difference
between first degree murder in this category and voluntary
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manslaughter is the difference between reason and passion.
State V. Thompson, supra. The test to determine Which
governs in each case was described in People v. Calton, 5
Utah 451, 16 Pac. 902 (1888) as ·the "prepondering" cause:
"But the lruw charges the ·act to malice or passion as the one or the other is found to be the prepondering cause of the act.... The passion must be
such as is sometimes called "irresistable;" yet it is
too strong to say that the reason of the party should
be dethroned, or he should act in a whirlwind of
passion. There must be sudden passion, upon reasonable provocation, to negative the ideal uf malice;
and the passion must proceed from what the law
accepts as adequate cause; else it will not reduce the
felonious killing to manslaugihter." Id., at 460, 16
Pac. at 907.
This is merely a restatement of the common law and has
been followed by this Court in more recent cases. State v.
Thompson and State v. Gallegos, supra.
The State submits that voluntary manslaughter was
not a lesser inc'luded offense in light of the evidence presented at trial, and that the trial court correctly withheld
the instructions on the lesser included offenses. The element of sudden quarrel or heat uf passion is not present in
this case. On tihe contrary, the evidence clearly warrants
an instruction of first degree murder.
Like Thompson, the appellant shot a gun into a room
with several people (T. 279). The apartment was very
small ( T. 305) , actually only one room ( T. 305) . She fired
at least six shots into the room, one hitting and killing Mr.
Melton. There were holes in the door and wall (T. 232,
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238), in the window screen (T. 237), and in the drapes (T.
238). Two witnesses identified the appelliant as the one
who came to the apartment and SJCuffled ·with Miller just
prior to the shooiting (T. 275, 306). There is no question
as to who did the shooting, but the question is why did the
shooting take place,i.e., was it a result of a sudden quarrel
or a result of malice? The facts clearly show malice and an
intention to do harm to aH the people in the room. She was
not directing her attack at Melton alone, but rather was
showing no regard whatever for human life (T. 372).
"She had entertained the thought of making Miller
squirm a little bit, since that wasn't the first time. He beat
me up a few years ago" (T. 373). Surely this fact alone is
evidence of malice. Considered with the other •evidence, the
act wa:s clearly dangerous to tlle lives of many peopile and
did evidence a depraved mind. And as this court said in
Thompson:
"We think from the manner of firing indiscriminately at all the people in the room the evidence was sufficient to justify a submission on that
question, 110 Utah at 127, 170 P. 2d at 160."
The elements of first degree murder under the category of an act greaitly dangerous to the lives of others evidencing a depraved mind were clearly shown by the prosecution. The information only charged murder in the first
degree (T. 10), and based upon the fact tllat the elements
of an offense are matters of law to be determined by the
judge, the appellant's reliance on State v. Ferguson, 74
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Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929) is unwarrant€d. This is a
"clear case" within the meaning of thait term as used in
State V. Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 230 Pac. 349 ( 1924), and the
trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that the
evidence did not warrant an instruction of a lesser offense.
It was not "necessarily" included and the court S10 ruled. On
the other hand, the elements of "sudden" quarrel or heat of
passion were not shown by the appellant to be the prepondering cause, and therefore the crime of voluntary manslaughter could not have been included as a lesser offense in
light of the evidence, and the trial oourt correctly refused to
.so instruct the jury. Based upon the actual ielements involved
and those actually proven by the ev~dence, and also upon
the fact that appellant relies solely on her own tes~mony
to show voluntary mansliaughter, the respondent submits
that no error resulted in the tria:l court and the decision
below must be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE PROSECUTION TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE APPELLANT AS TO A PAST
A'.CT WHICH WAS RELEVANT TO THE
CRIME COMMITTED.
The act being challenged occu11red approximately seven
years before this shooting and 1was between the appellant
and apparently Mr. Miller (T. 335, 340, 379) .. rfhe first
time this was objected to was during the State's re~direct
examination of Mr. Miller (T. 339). The defense counsel
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had already brought this evidence out on cross-examination
( T. 335) and the re-direct was clearly within the scope of
the prior examination by defense counsel. Furthermore,
the defense counsel broug'ht this out realizing that it was
about the appellant and thus opened the door for incriminating and impeaching testimony against the appellant.
The test as to whether this testimony is admisstble iis
well founded in Utah. In State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8,
361 P. 2d 412 (1961), the court said:
". . . Where evidence has special relevancy to
prove the crime of which the defendant stands
charged, it may be allowed for that purpose; and
the fact that it shows another crime will not render
the evidence inadmissible." Id., at 12, 361 P. 2d at
415.
1

See also, State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P. 2d 772
( 1969). This evidence does have special relevancy to prove
the crime charged. It shows a lack of sudden passion, for
example, thus eliminating voluntary manslaughter. It
shows that appellant entertained malice against Mr. Miller,
and it shows the necessary intent and malice to evidence a
depraved mind. The elements necessary to prove first degree murder in the category of greatly dangerous acts includes intent and malice. Surely, the act challenged by the
appellant does have the special releviancy to prove the crime
of first degree muvder in the category as charged.
1

Furthermore, the reception of this evidence was not
prejudicial to the appellant. In light of the abundance of
other evidence connecting her with the killing, it cannot be
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that she suffered undue prejudice by the reception of this
testimony. This is especially true in 1'ight of the fact that
appelilant's counsel brought out this information prim- to
the State's examination of the appellant (T. 335). The
Supreme Court must "give judgment without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties. If error has been committed, it shaill not be
presumed to have resulted in prejudice." Utah Oode Ann.
§ 77-42-1 (1953).
CONCLUSION
There were no errors committed by the trial court
which would warrant a new trial. The court wa:s correct
in refusing the instructions of lesser included offenses because it was a "clear case" which did not warrant such instructions. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in allowing the appellant to tesrbify conceming an act relevant
to the crime charged. Where this evidence has been brought
out by the defense counsel himself, he cannot claim that appe1lant was prejudiced thereby. We submit that the judgment of conviction for murder .in the first degree must be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
DAVID S. YOUNG
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

